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Abstract:  
Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of 
others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we 
attempted to replicate their results, however, we found no evidence of that social comparisons 
affected donation decisions. Most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang 
and Croson also found were not influenced by social information. 
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1. Introduction 
The desire to conform to social norms can be a strong influence on human behavior (Bernheim, 
1994; Festinger, 1954). Failure to adhere to these norms can lead to moral costs (Levitt and List, 
2007), and possibly monetary (Ostrom et al., 1992; Yamagishi, 1986) or nonmonetary sanctions 
(Masclet et al., 2003). Conformity can also arise as a means of acquiring information by observing 
and imitating the behavior of others.  Models of conformity can explain cooperation in laboratory 
and field environments, including social dilemmas (e.g., Carpenter, 2004; Bardsley and 
Sausgruber, 2005; Velez et al., 2009), employee recognition (Bradler et al., 2014), information 
cascades (Goeree and Yariv, 2015) and pressing a “Like” button on Facebook (Egebark and 
Ekström, 2011).  Social comparisons may lead to conformity if the behavior of others serves as a 
reference point for individual decisions (Zafar, 2011), and it has been used effectively to influence 
behavior in a number of domains, including energy conservation (Allcott, 2011), water 
conservation (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Ferraro et al., 2011), hotel towel use (Goldstein et al., 2008; 
Schultz et al., 2008), and preferences for environmental goods (Carlsson et al., 2010).  
 With the rapid growth in charitable giving (List, 2011), there has been an increase in 
attention to mechanisms that are effective at fundraising, including public revelation of decisions 
and the use of social comparisons. In laboratory public goods experiments, public revelation of 
individual decisions tends to increase cooperation (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; List et al., 2004; 
Rege and Telle, 2004; Lopez et al., 2012; Spraggon et al., 2015), and observability of donations 
by third parties has also yielded higher donations in field experiments (Soetevent, 2005; Alpízar 
and Martinsson, 2013). Providing social information about the behavior of others has improved 
cooperation in laboratory public goods games (Zafar, 2011), dictator games (Cason and Mui, 1998) 
and ultimatum games (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). In a mail fundraising campaign at a Swiss 
university, Frey and Meier (2004) found a small positive effect of social information on the 
decision to donate. Similarly, in a field experiment soliciting donations for a Costa Rican national 
park, Alpízar and Martinsson (2010) found that informing visitors about common donation 
amounts led to conformity with the social reference.  
 The focus of this paper is an attempt to replicate the results of Shang and Croson (2009) 
who found that some social comparisons can be effective in increasing donations to public radio. 
During the June and September 2013 on-air fundraising campaign for an anonymous public radio 
station, Rachel Croson and Jen Shang incorporated a series of social comparison treatments that 
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are described in three papers. Since the studies were all part of the same pair of pledge drives, the 
procedures are identical. The key differences among the papers are the subsets of data used and 
the focus of the analysis.  Individuals who called to make a donation were randomly assigned to 
either a social information condition or a control group.  When volunteers answered phones to 
accept the donation, they read the following script: "Hello, STATION_NAME member line. Are 
you a new member or a renewing member of STATION_NAME? We had another member, they 
contributed $X. How much would you like to pledge today?” where $X was the social information 
provided to the caller. To determine the values of $X, they reviewed the donations from the 
previous year’s campaign. Shang and Croson (2009) reported the results from using the 50th ($75), 
85th ($180) and 90th ($300) percentiles; Croson and Shang (2013) used the 95th ($600) and 99th 
($1000) percentiles.  The combined results of these two papers suggested that social comparisons 
for public radio donations were most effective at increasing donations when drawn from the 90th 
to 95th percentiles. At the 99th percentile, presumably the comparison was perceived as unrealistic 
and was therefore too high to be effective.  
 Croson and Shang (2008) used the phone campaign data for only the renewing members 
and combined it with additional data from a mail campaign. They tested whether the difference 
between the social information condition ($X) and the individual’s most recent donation affected 
the change in the current donation. They found that the change in donations moved in the direction 
of the social information. Those individuals for whom the social information was greater than their 
previous donation averaged a $12 increase in giving, whereas those with a lower social information 
averaged a $24 reduction in contributions.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
To the extent possible, we followed the procedures described in Shang and Croson (2009). Our 
field experiment was conducted during the Fall pledge drive (October 15-24, 2014) for Alaska 
Public Media, based in Anchorage. During the pledge drive, radio listeners were encouraged to 
call and make a donation. As in their study, we had three social information treatments using the 
50th, 85th and 90th percentiles from the previous two Fall pledge drives ($120, $240, and $360, 
respectively); there was also a no information control. That these amounts occurred in $120 
increments was convenient because the station was making an effort to encourage listeners to 
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become “sustaining members” with regular monthly payments. To avoid deception, we ensured 
that another member had actually donated these amounts. 
 Phones were answered by volunteers who used the following script: “Thank you for calling 
Alaska Public Media. Would you like to become a sustainer?” Depending upon the response and 
treatment, the volunteer read (or omitted in the control): “Another member donated [$120, $240, 
or $360]. How much would you like to donate?”1 The pledge drive did not include any thank you 
gifts or incentives that were based on the amount donated. Unlike Shang and Croson, our 
volunteers were not blind to the treatment when answering the phone. The scripts were read from 
proprietary software that had limited customization options. As each call was answered, the 
software immediately presented the volunteer with a new script that included a randomly assigned 
treatment.  
 
3. Results 
This pledge drive received substantially fewer phone donations than the two previous Fall pledge 
drives, which averaged about 1500 individual phone donations per campaign. This was the result 
of two primary factors: (1) a large shift away from phone to online donations and (2) a substantial 
increase in the number of “sustaining members” who automatically donate by credit card every 
month and no longer need to call during the pledge drive. Of the 628 donations received, 287 were 
online and therefore could not be included in the analysis. We also excluded 24 donations of $1000 
or more that were made by phone (Table 1). These were all renewing members who had made 
similar large donations in the past. For the 317 observations that were included in the analysis, 
donations averaged about $150 with little difference among the treatments. Pairwise comparisons 
of treatments using nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirmed this conclusion: all tests 
failed to reject the hypothesis that the treatments and the control were drawn from populations 
with the same distribution. 
 Table 2 presents two regression models that used the same approach as Shang and Croson 
(their Table 2). The first is a standard OLS regression, and the second is a robust regression which 
controls for outliers. The models included dummy variables for the three social information 
treatments. We also controlled for sustaining members (same as the instalment variable in Shang 
                                                 
1 Our script closely followed that of Shang and Croson, except that our station wanted to also include the offer to 
become a sustainer.  
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and Croson) and for renewing members.  The models also included fixed effects for the date of the 
transaction. For confidentiality reasons, we did not have access to any personal information other 
than an individual’s donation history and cannot control for gender.  
 For both of our models, none of the coefficients for the social information treatments were 
statistically significant. A test of the hypothesis that all three social information coefficients were 
jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected (p=0.654). Consistent with Shang and Croson, the 50th 
percentile was not expected to be significant; since this is an upward comparison for half the callers 
and downward for the other half, the two effects should cancel out.  However, the absence of a 
social information effect for the 90th percentile differs from Shang and Croson.   
 To reconcile the contrasting results, we note that a large majority of our phone pledges 
were from renewing members (85%). Only 49 of the 317 donations in our analysis were from new 
members. This was substantially different from Shang and Croson who reported about 40% of 
donations from renewing members. They suggested that social information is more likely to have 
an effect in ambiguous circumstances, which would be more germane to new donors. With a 
roughly even split of new and renewing members, they were able to test this conjecture by 
rerunning their regression models using only new donors and again using only renewing members 
(their Table 3).  They found that, as conjectured, the social information effect was limited to new 
donors. Social information at the median value had no effect on new donations, but it was 
significant at the 85th and 90th percentiles. Their renewing members, on the other hand, were not 
influenced by the comparisons; none of the social information conditions were statistically 
significant for this group.  
 Following Shang and Croson’s approach, we re-ran our regressions separately for new and 
renewing members (Table 3). Consistent with Shang and Croson, we do not observe a treatment 
effect for renewing donors. However, we also do not observe a treatment effect for new donors 
which is contrary to Shang and Croson. This could be due to the relatively small number of new 
donors (n=49) in our data. Therefore, our results are consistent with one of Shang and Croson’s 
results. Renewing members’ donation decisions do not appear to be influenced by social 
information. However, the lack of new donors in our data prevents us from testing whether this 
group is affected. 
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4. Conclusions 
In many domains, providing information about the behavior of others has been effective at 
affecting individual decisions. In a series of papers, Shang and Croson draw on this research and 
provide social information in an attempt to increase donations for a public radio station. They 
found that social information can be effective, but only over a limited range. Specifically, their 
results suggested that social information was most effective for new donors when the social 
comparison is drawn from the 90th to 95th percentile of previous donations. This study attempted 
to replicate their results. We found no evidence that donations were responsive to comparison 
amounts. This could be because most of our donors were renewing members, who Shang and 
Croson also found are not responsive to social comparisons.   
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Table 1. Distribution of Member Types 
 Pledge < $1000 Pledge  $1000 
Treatment Renewal New Total Renew New Total 
Control 119 17 136 10 0 10 
$120 46 14 60 6 0 6 
$240 56 7 63 4 0 4 
$360 47 11 58 4 0 4 
Online 220 51 271 15 1 16 
Total 488 100 588 39 1 40 
 
 
 
Table 2. Pledge Amounts 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS Robust 
Constant 97.647*** 67.521*** 
 (30.98) (19.52) 
$120 (50th percentile) 2.832 5.660 
 (19.03) (11.99) 
$240 (85th percentile) -8.578 -8.360 
 (19.21) (12.10) 
$360 (90th percentile) 0.680 7.754 
 (19.49) (12.28) 
Renewing 35.352* 37.492*** 
 (18.99) (11.96) 
Sustainer (Instalment) 90.835*** 98.418*** 
 (18.77) (11.82) 
N 317 317 
Models includes fixed effects for date. 
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Table 3. Pledge Amounts by New and by Renewing Members 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS-new Robust-new OLS-renewing Robust-renewing 
Constant 242.602*** 100.000* 123.676*** 102.905*** 
 (84.73) (52.65) (26.89) (17.33) 
$120 (50th percentile) 11.558 -5.415 -3.723 4.154 
 (44.28) (27.51) (21.42) (13.81) 
$240 (85th percentile) 23.737 -37.370 -15.689 -8.293 
 (53.28) (33.11) (20.78) (13.39) 
$360 (90th percentile) -14.439 -44.186 -4.917 12.326 
 (47.48) (29.50) (21.95) (14.15) 
Sustainer (Instalment) 71.059* 84.649*** 97.655*** 111.237*** 
 (37.22) (23.12) (22.01) (14.19) 
N 49 49 268 268 
Models includes fixed effects for date. 
 
 
